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I. Introduction
This paper addresses two very important, but usually neglected, aspects of Argentina's
federal revenue-sharing system. The first aspect refers to the horizontal tensions present -in
addition to the traditional vertical one of lack of fiscal correspondence- in the current
system of revenue-sharing [Porto (1999)]. At the federal level, these horizontal tensions
take the form of conflicting goals among Ministries regarding policy making in the
provinces. For example, Ministries do not  coordinate efforts to help provinces to solve the
problem of financing  the provision of local public-goods while achieving provincial fiscal
balance. At the local -i.e. provincial- level horizontal tensions take the form of conflicting
goals between the citizenry and an imperfectly controlled politician-bureaucrat who wants
to minimize administrative effort and can, in this way, affect the (stochastic) cost of public
good provision. The second aspect of the federal tax system that we want to address refers
to the degree of risk-sharing between federal and local jurisdictions over uncertain
outcomes; which is an important issue from the point of view of economic welfare. Risk-
sharing was not explicitly discussed in the bilateral agreements that paved the way to the
current federal revenue-sharing system, and it is not clear how to deal with it in future
reforms of the system. Nicolini et al. (1999) find some evidence of risk-sharing motives in
the management of ATNs, but they do not address explicitly the issue of private
consumption smoothing, nor relate the problem of risk-sharing to the horizontal tensions
aforementioned.
Taken together, these two aspects of revenue-sharing create a difficult distribution
                                                       
*
 I would like to thank Jorge M. Streb (Universidad del CEMA) and Federico Weinschelbaum (Universidad
de San Andrés) for very helpful comments on a previous draft.  The usual disclaimer applies.
2problem because they make it impossible for a federal authority that finances local public-
good provision with federal grants to distinguish local government effort from the random
effect of shocks out of any observed cost realization. The main objective of this paper is to
start thinking about  a solution to such a problem by running an "economics thought-
experiment", i.e. by including these aspects of revenue-sharing in a model economy and
theoretically explore the form that fiscal arrangements between federal and local
governments should take in order to maximize economic welfare. The model can thus be
cast in the standard framework of an agency problem involving a conflict between
incentives and insurance. In particular, this can be achieved by finding the form of a federal
grant that partially finances the provision of a local public-good in a federation where local
governments are run by imperfectly-controlled politician-bureaucrats, and the stochastic
distribution of the cost of public-good provision depends on the administrative effort
exerted by the local government. The most important question being whether, or by how
much, risk-sharing must be traded-off for the right incentives within the model. There is a
growing consensus among Argentine economists that some sort of rule regarding this
particular point should be adopted in actual agreements between jurisdictions (Saiegh and
Tommasi, 1999); and that this rule should specify punishments and rewards (Porto, 1999),
that is, the exact trade-off between incentives and insurance.
Formally, we model the fiscal relationship between federal and local jurisdictions as
a contract between the local government and a Federal Fiscal Agency (FFA). In its optimal
form, this contract would specify the type of grant scheme to be followed by the FFA as
well as the optimal levels of local public-good and administrative effort to be provided by
the local government. However, since we shall be assuming that administrative effort is
unobservable and the provision of local public-goods is not verifiable, this optimal contract
would not be legally enforceable and, in consequence, would never be signed. Instead, we
show that the grant scheme should be designed in a way that the information given by the
realized cost -assumed observable- is used by the FFA to induce the local government to
behave in compliance with contractual terms. We therefore show how the FFA must weigh
its risk-sharing and incentive concerns. In the optimal case,  federal institutions would
typically try to insure local consumption against cost shocks. However, when local
government's effort is unobservable, this insurance can be only implemented at the expense
of the right incentives.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces and justifies the model
economy to be used to analyze interjurisdictional contracts. In section III the optimal
contract under perfect observability of administrative effort and public good provision is
derived. This contract is a benchmark since the insurance and incentives motives of the
FFA are not in conflict here. In section IV the contract for the more realistic case of
unobservable administrative effort and not verifiable level of public good provision is
derived. Section V concludes.
II. The Model
We think of the economy as populated by three agents: a federal authority, a local
(provincial) government, and a local representative consumer.
Representative consumer
The representative consumer has a fixed real income y  which finances the consumption of
a private good c and the lump-sum taxes levied by local and federal governments, lr  and
rf , respectively. The budget constraint is the following
(1)                                                         crry fl ++=
A local public good γ  is provided by the local government, and the consumer's preferences
over  private and public good consumption are given by the utility function ( )γ,cV , with
( ) ( ) ( )γγ vcucV +=,
Both ( )⋅u  and ( )⋅v  are increasing and concave functions of their arguments.
Local government
The local government is managed by an imperfectly-controlled politician-bureaucrat whose
objective function is L c e( , , ; )γ θ , with
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )ecVecL υθγθγ −= ,;,,
That is, local government’s objective only partially coincides with that of the representative
consumer. Local government’s welfare is given by ( )γ,cV  minus the term ( )υ e , which
represents its dislike for administrative effort e .1 We assume that local government’s
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 We do not explain how this objective function come to be (a political economics problem) , but
4objective function is concave in all its arguments; i.e. ( )u c' > 0 , ( )u c'' < 0 , ( )v ' θ > 0 ,
( )v '' θ < 0and ( )υ ' e > 0 , ( )υ '' e > 0 .
Technology
The local public good is provided by the local government. We assume that the cost of
providing the public good depends on local government administrative effort e  and the
realization of a shock. Let κ i be the marginal and per unit physical cost of providing the
public good in state of nature i , i n= 1,..., , and define ( ) [ ]p e p ei i= =κ κ the probability
of occurrence of κ i  conditioned on e ; i.e. administrative effort affects the distribution of
probability of κ i . We can rationalize this specification by thinking of administrative effort
as the effort to control the size of the local bureaucratic structure, and by further assuming
that the provision of the public good can not be implemented without the aid of local
bureaucracy. We assume (as is standard in the literature) that ( )p ei > 0 , for all i , all e .
This means that any cost may result for any effort of local government. Of course,
( )p eiin=∑ =1 1.
Local market- clearing allocations
Local government finances the provision of the public good with local lump-sum taxes, rl ,
and a state-contingent federal grant. Let τ i  be the federal grant in state of nature i . Then
the following must hold for all i
(3)                                                     rl i i+ =τ κ γ
We assume that the amount of federal taxes fr  levied is fixed, but that local taxes rl  can be
changed by the local government in a way dictated by this budget constraint. Granted this
prerogative to the local government, the true budget constraint of the local economy can be
derived from the local government's budget constraint (3) and the consumer’s budget
constraint (1), and it is given by
                                                                                                                                                                        
rather take an economic policy analyst's view and assume that the parameter [ ]θ θ θ∈ , is the
equilibrium value of some game between local political forces representing the citizenry and the
bureaucracy. For example,  a society in which θ θ=  can be thought of as being more democratic
and more politically developed ; i.e. as having been able to achieve local governments with the
5(4)                                                        y c ri i f+ = + +τ κ γ
An allocation for this local economy is given by the levels of private good consumption,
public good provision, administrative effort and local lump-sum taxes levied, and can be
found by solving the local government’s problem, which is to maximize the expected value
of (2) subject to (4) for given y , iτ , fr and iκ . Formally, the problem is to
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }∑
=
−+−−+
n
i
ifii
e
evryuepMax
1,
υθγγκτ
γ
Local taxes levied and local private consumption can then be derived from the levels of
administrative effort and public-good provision that solve this problem.
This problem looks similar to the approach of optimal taxation models in which the
optimal tax is the one which maximizes the utility function of the representative consumer
subject to the budget constraint of the economy, but it is very different indeed; the
difference is that in optimal taxation models the government spending to be financed by
optimal taxation is given and exogenous, and here it is partially determined by the local
government' s own behavior; even more, local government’s objective function is different
to the consumer' s one.
Federal fiscal authorities
We assume that grants to the local economy are administered by a Federal Fiscal Agency
(FFA). We assume for the present case that this agency only cares for the net transfer to the
local economy, so that its objective is to maximize  ( )[ ]p e ri
i
n
f i
=
∑ −
1
τ .
We model federal authorities as a FFA rather than resorting to a full-modeling of the
federal government because we want to concentrate on grant giving and isolate this
problem from other concerns the federal government may have. The FFA has one clear
objective in our model: to maximize the expected net revenue from the province; while the
objectives of a federal government are multiple; for example, in grant designing a federal
government may weigh not only the insurance and incentives concerns we want to study
                                                                                                                                                                        
lowest possible bureaucratic representation.
6here but also a concern for macroeconomic adjustment and stability (Saiegh and Tommasi,
1999). Another good reason not to model the federal government but work instead with a
federal agency with definite objectives is that (also according to Saiegh and Tommasi,
1999) the federal government is a self-interested opportunistic actor itself in the game
which defines the amount and type of grant given to the provinces; however, to take into
account this behavior would exceed the purpose of this paper, since, among other things,
we would have to move from a setting of bilateral contractual arrangements to more
complicated settings where the federal government signs multilateral contracts with several
provinces at the same time. Finally, the implications for institutional reform coming from
much of the political economics literature suggest that the federal government should be
actually replaced by a federal agency for the purpose of intergovenmental fiscal
agreements, so by modeling the problem as contract between the FFA and the local
government we do not lose generality and concentrate on the issues that matter.
Intergovernmental contracts
We assume that the FFA proposes a contract to the local government which the latter must
accept or reject. The FFA must propose an acceptable contract, i.e. a contract that assures
the local government a given minimum level of utility U . Is the contractual view inevitable
when dealing with federal grants design ? There are good reasons to believe that the answer
is a emphatic yes. Porto (1999) emphasizes that the incentives of federal authorities are
different from those of a provincial government. In the case of federal grants, this is very
clear: while the federal government wants to maximize the net federal revenue in a given
province, the provincial government wants to maximize the part of the cost of public good
provision not financed by local taxation. In the same line of argument, Saiegh and Tommasi
(1999) emphasize that “revenue-sharing mechanisms and intergovernmental transfers
systems are the results of bargaining processes in which numerous political actors with
different interests are involved”, while Nicolini et al. (1999) study opportunistic behavior of
local governments as deviations from contracts previously signed between local and federal
jurisdictions. We concentrate on bilateral contracts not only for analytical convenience but
also because the initial negotiations which paved the way to present revenue-sharing system
were actually bilateral in essence (Saiegh and Tommasi, 1999).
7III. Intergovernmental contracts: The benchmark case
Although it is actually very difficult to observe the administrative effort of the local
government and to verify the provision of the local public-good, in this section we assume
the contrary and derive the optimal contract under perfect observability. We do so because
this contract provides a benchmark for the analysis of the trade-off between insurance and
incentives found in the case of unobservable effort. When effort is observable and the
provision of public-good verifiable, then total consumption insurance can be provided to
the local representative agent along with the incentives for the local government to provide
the right levels of administrative effort and local public-good. The form of this contract  is
given by the solution to the following problem:
[ ] ( )[ ]Max p e re i f ii
n
i i n, , , ,...,γ τ
τ
=
−
=
∑
1 1
                        s.t           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p e u y r v e Ui i f i
i
n
+ − − + − ≥
=
∑ τ κ γ γ θ υ
1
                 (PC)
This problem can be solved in two steps. In the first, we compute the optimal grant scheme
for any administrative effort and any level of public good. In the second step,  we compute
the administrative effort and the level of public good consistent with the grant computed in
step one; this effort and this level of public good are the ones to be effectively implemented
by the local government in this environment with observable effort and verifiable provision
of the local public-good.
The grant scheme
The optimal grant scheme, for given levels of administrative effort and public good, is the
one that minimizes the expected grant subject to the participation constraint of the local
economy. Formally,
[ ] ( )Min p ei i n i ii
n
τ
τ
, ,...,= =
∑
1 1
                        s.t           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p e u y r v e Ui i f i
i
n
+ − − + − ≥
=
∑ τ κ γ γ θ υ
1
                 (PC)
8Let λ  be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint (PC) facing
the FFA; since c y ri i f i= + − −τ κ γ , the first-order condition with respect to τ i  is the
following
(5)                                                       ( ) λ=icu '
1
From this equation we derive two important conclusions:
1. λ > 0 , since the marginal utility of consumption is always positive in an internal
solution. This implies that the PC is binding, which means that local government gets
its reserve utility in this contract.
2. c ci = , a constant, for all i . This means that private consumption is the same across
states of nature. Thus, the FFA offers the local government a contract which implies
that grants are given to the local government in a way that completely insures the
representative consumer against surprises in the cost of the public good. Notice that this
constitutes a Pareto Optimal allocation since local government is assumed to be risk-
averse while the FFA is risk-neutral. This also implies that local government does not
have to change local taxes to finance exogenous changes in the cost of public good
provision. Figure 1 illustrates this result.
Since the participation constraint binds, ( ) ( )[ ]c u U v e= − +−1 γ θ υ , the optimal grant is
given by the following formula
τ κ γi i= +Τ      for all i i n, ,...,= 1
with ( ) ( )[ ]T u U v e r yf= − + + −−1 γ θ υ , a constant. Therefore, in order to insure the
consumer, the FFA designs a grant which is linear in the cost of providing the public.
9Figure 1: Full insurance in the benchmark contract
Administrative effort and local public-good provision
Now we solve the second part of the problem. The optimal levels of administrative effort
and public good to be provided by local government are those which maximize the
expected utility of the FFA given the optimal contract to be provided in any given state of
nature. Formally,
[ ] ( )[ ]Max p e re i f ii
n
,γ
τ−
=
∑
1
                        s.t           ( ) ( )[ ]τ γ θ υ κ γi f iu U v e r y= − + + − +−1
given U , y , and rf .
For a given administrative effort, the first-order condition with respect to public-good
provision is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )p e u U v e vi i∑ = − +−κ γ θ υ γ1 ' '
This is the familiar Samuelson condition for the provision of public goods. The LHS is the
expected marginal cost of providing the public good, and the RHS is the ratio of the
marginal utility of public good consumption to the marginal utility of private good
consumption. Therefore, under this grant scheme, the Pareto Optimal amount of public
good is provided.
 The first-order condition with respect to administrative effort is the following:
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )p e u U v e ei i' ' '∑ = − +−κ γ γ θ υ θ υ1
Given the level of public-good provision, this equation gives the optimal administrative
effort. It is the effort for which the expected marginal decrease in the cost of providing the
public good resulting from an increase in effort (LHS) just equals the marginal
compensation required by the local government to exert it.
IV. Intergovernmental contracts: The asymmetric information case
In the previous section we derived the Pareto Optimal benchmark contract. However the
FFA needs instead to design contracts which take into account the moral hazard implied in
the relationship between the federal and provincial governments. In this section we derive
the grant scheme taking into account the unobservable nature of administrative effort and
public-good provision. In particular, we show how the FFA must deal with the trade-off
between efficiency and incentives, i.e. by how much we depart from optimal insurance in
order to give enough incentives.
The grant scheme can be found by solving the following program:
[ ] ( )[ ]∑
=
−
=
n
i
ifi
e
repMax
nii 1,, ,...,1,
τ
τγ
 s.t.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Uevryuepn
i
fiii ≥−+−−+∑
=
υθγγκτ
1
                              (PC)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



−+−−+∈ ∑
=
evryuepmaxe
n
i
fiii
e
υθγγκτγ
γ 1,
arg,                      (IC)
This is a much more complicated problem because it is not necessarily a convex
programming problem. Following Holmström (1979) we redefine effort and assume that
probabilities satisfy the linear distribution function condition.2  That is, there are two
conditional probability distributions over the states of nature, one for high effort, Hip , and
another one for low effort, Lip . In this setting we can think of the local government's
behavior as being characterized by a mixed strategy approach to problem of choosing
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effort. Let’s redefine e  such that ( ) ( ) LiHii peepep −+= 1 , with [ ]1,0∈e . That is, the local
government can play a mixed strategy which defines a new probability distribution which is
a linear combination of the other two. We should now interpret e  as follows: as 1→e , the
more the new probability distribution resembles the high effort conditional probability
distribution.
We assume states of nature i are ordered according to the realized size of the shock, i.e.
κ κ κ1 2< < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < n . We also assume that the likelihood ratio ( )
p p
p e
i
H
i
L
i
−
 is decreasing in i ;
that is, the larger is the difference p pi
H
i
L
− with respect to ( )p ei , the more precise the
signal that a larger effort has been exerted. This property is known as the monotone
likelihood ratio condition.
When ( )epi  is defined in this way e  and γ  are unique, and we can replace the IC in the
maximization problem above with the first-order conditions for the administrative effort
and the level of public good which satisfy IC . Then, the problem of the optimal scheme
solves the following problem:
[ ] ( )[ ]( )∑
=
−−+
=
n
i
if
L
i
H
i
e
rpeepMax
nii 1,,
1
,...,1,
τ
τγ
s.t.
                 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) Uevryupeepn
i
ifi
L
i
H
i ≥−+−−+−+∑
=
υθγγκτ
1
1                          (PC)
                       
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 01 '
1
'
=−−+−+− ∑
=
iifi
n
i
L
i
H
i ryupeepv κγκτγ                          (IC 1)
                                   
[ ] ( ) ( ) 0'
1
=−−−+−∑
=
eryupp
n
i
ifi
L
i
H
i υθγκτ                          (IC 2)
Let  λ , γµ , and eµ  be the Lagrange  multipliers for PC, IC 1, and IC 2, respectively. Then
the first-order condition with respect to iτ  is given by
(6)                                ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ii
i
i
L
i
H
i
e
i cu
cu
ep
pp
cu
κµµλ γ '
''
'
1
−

 −
+=
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This equation is an extended version of  (5), but corrected for the presence of moral hazard
in the behavior of the local government.  As can be observed an important first conclusion
can be derived from (6): private consumption is not fully insured anymore; it shall vary
with the realization of the shocks. In order to give the right incentives the FFA would
propose a contingent grant such that the amount granted would be lower whenever there is
a sign of low effort, this would force the local government to rise local taxes and lower
private consumption for a given level of public-good provision; therefore this contract gives
the right incentives to the local government to make a lot of effort, since it is costly for the
local government to affect private consumption of the representative agent. As we can see
full insurance cannot be given to the representative agent if the FFA has also to give the
right incentive to the local politician-bureaucrat to make administrative effort  and provide
the public good.
The analysis of equation (6) will tell us by how much we have to depart from full
insurance. In what follows we assume that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is
constant; i.e. ( ) ( )( ) Ai
i
iA r
cu
cu
cr =−=
'
''
 for all ic , with constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA)
preferences. Now re-write (6) as follows
( ) ( ) iAi
L
i
H
i
e
i
r
ep
pp
cu
κµµλ γ+

 −
+=
'
1
Ignoring for a moment the third term on the RHS, the rest of the equation is the familiar
result from contract theory which establishes that payments to the agent should be linked to
the signal of the effort exerted. In our case this means that private consumption shall vary
directly with variations in the likelihood ratio ( )
p p
p e
i
H
i
L
i
−
; the lower the likelihood ratio the
stronger the signal that a low effort has been exerted and therefore a lower consumption
should be allowed. This is easy to see since the lower the RHS, the lower the LHS should
be as well, which requires a higher marginal utility or lower consumption. That is, the
incentive scheme to make the local government exert the required administrative effort is to
give a grant that will imply less local private consumption whenever the cost of providing
the public good is higher. The intuition, again, is that consumption shall fall in bad states
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because the FFA will lower the amount granted to the local government in those states:
since the provision of the public-good wont be much lower then, from local government's
budget constraint (3), the only way to finance the increase in cost provision is by increasing
local taxes, which will affect private consumption [from the consumer's budget constraint
(1)]. The fact that increasing local taxes is costly to the local government (who maximizes,
at least in part, the welfare of the representative agent) this scheme gives the local
government the right incentives to make more effort and increase the likelihood of lower
expected costs. Therefore, from the analysis of changes in the LHS to changes in the
second term of the RHS we find that the contract implies a negative relationship between
private consumption and the likelihood ratio; this negative association is necessary for the
FFA to give incentives to the local government.
Now let's include the third term of the RHS into the analysis. Notice that because
the coefficient of risk aversion is positive this contract implies a positive relationship
between private consumption and the marginal and per unit cost of providing the public-
good. Behind this positive association is the insurance concern of the FFA. Notice then that
the interaction between both, the negative  change in private consumption that results from
a decline in the likelihood ratio, and the positive one that results from an increase in costs
determine the schedule of ic  over all states i  (This result is illustrated in Figure 2). That is,
the term iAr κµγ  can be thought of as a correction term related to insurance in some way.  It
moderates the punishment of the FFA over the local economy that a fall in the likelihood
ratio would imply. Private consumption falls with i  if private consumption falls with the
likelihood ratio by a larger amount than it increases with iκ . The resulting variation in
private consumption depends on the relative weight of the likelihood ratio and the
efficiency-correcting term; the weights being the positive Lagrange multipliers eµ  and γµ .
It seems safe to expect that the first effect is stronger than the second one.
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Figure 2: Imperfect Consumption Insurance with Moral Hazard
In Figure 2, panel B, quadrants I and IV illustrate the relationship, resulting from the
contract, between the realized cost and private consumption, for a given the value of the
likelihood ratio (LR, in Figure 2), in two states of nature )0(i  and )1(i ; while quadrants II
and III illustrate the relationship, resulting from the contract, between the likelihood ratio
and private consumption, for a given the value of the realized cost, in those two states of
nature; then, in panel A, Figure 2 depicts the net effect on consumption of going from one
state of nature to the other (worse) one.
The consumption insurance concern summarized in the term iAr κµγ  is related to
local public-good provision and local taxation in the following way: the federal authority
needs the local government to do two things, to provide the correct administrative effort
and to provide the correct amount of public good. Suppose for a moment that we do away
with the correcting term then private consumption varies only with changes in the
likelihood ratio. Assume that in a given state this likelihood ratio is very low then, for a
given level of public-good provision, this would entail an important fall in private
consumption, because the size of the federal grant falls and local taxes are risen; however, a
15
drop in private consumption then rises the marginal utility of private consumption in that
state, which causes an additional increase in the expected marginal cost of providing the
public-good; public-good provision would fall greatly and welfare will be additionally
affected unless we correct the fall in consumption by limiting the rise of local taxes, this
correction is dictated by the term iAr κµγ ; it adjusts the fall in private consumption so that
public good provision does vary too much across states. That is, federal grants should fall
in bad states but without hurting the provision of local public-goods that much. This
scheme would thus provide the right incentives to the local government to provide both,
administrative effort and the public good.
If the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is not constant then the movements in
ci are difficult to follow from movements in the likelihood ratio and the efficiency-
correction term; but we can still analyze the grant scheme for the case of constant relative
risk aversion. If the utility function is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion; i.e.
( ) ( )( ) Ri
ii
iR r
cu
ccu
cr =−=
'
''
 for all ic , with constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) preferences
then  (6) can be re-written as
( ) ( ) 



+

 −
+=
i
i
R
i
L
i
H
i
e
i c
r
ep
pp
cu
κµµλ γ'
1
It is easy to see that correction of private consumption fluctuations is larger (that is, c  falls
less in bad states) as a consequence of changes in either ( )
p p
p e
i
H
i
L
i
−
 or iκ  with CRRA than
with CARA preferences. Regarding the schedule of ic  over all states i , it is difficult to say
how much it differs from one case to the other.
V. Conclusion
This paper addresses theoretically the issues of "horizontal tensions" and "risk-sharing"
facing federal authorities in their fiscal relationship with provincial governments in
Argentina. We find the extent to which federal authorities must deviate from a linear grant
scheme, that perfectly insures consumers across states of nature, to give provincial
governments incentives to exert the right amount of administrative effort on the local
16
bureaucracy. The extent of departure from  perfect insurance is determined by the
interaction between changes in the amount of federal resources granted to the province
which are dictated by the probability distributions of public-good cost and changes in the
amount of resources granted which are dictated by an efficiency-correcting term. This term
is, in turn, determined by the coefficient of risk aversion of the representative consumer and
the realized cost of local public-good provision.
In this model economy the amount of federal resources granted must change in a
way which is inversely proportional to the change in the cost of providing the local public-
good. In the actual fiscal relationship between federal and provincial jurisdictions of
Argentina not unusually we observe the opposite phenomenon. Sometimes federal
resources are granted proportional to the size of local bureaucracy ( a proxy for the cost of
providing the local public-good); moreover, there is a feeling that provincial governments
which make an above average administrative effort are not rewarded, while those which
have budget trouble due to overcrowding bureaucracies are not being punished with a
decline in federal funds. Our model would then explain why under this circumstances
provincial governments seem reluctant to make a definitive administrative effort to reduce
the size of local bureaucracy and improve the provision of local public-goods.
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